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Oregon v. Elstad: THE CAT IS NOT 
OUT OF THE BAG 
In an opinion harshly criticized by dis-
senting Justices Brennan, Marshall, and 
Stevens, Justice O'Connor and the Su-
preme Court have delivered a new ap-
proach to the fifth amendment's self-in-
crimination clause. Though fairly narrow, 
the holding that a subsequent confession 
gained after Miranda warnings is valid 
even where a previous uncoerced confes-
sion was obtained from a suspect absent 
Miranda rights discards well-founded doc-
trines which for years have buttressed the 
Miranda rationale. As the dissenters in-
timate, it is more the reasoning than the ac-
tual holding of the Court which fosters a 
nervous reaction. 
Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (1985), 
involved an 18-year-old accused of bur-
glarizing his neighbor's home. After being 
contacted by a witness to the burglary, 
the sheriff's office dispatched two offi-
cers to the home of Michael Elstad with a 
warrant for his arrest. Upon arriving at 
the home, both officers were escorted to 
Elstad's bedroom by his mother. After 
dressing, Elstad accompanied them into 
the living room, sat down with one of the 
officers, and following a brief discussion 
of the burglary, confessed to the crime. 
His Miranda rights had not been given. 
Approximately one hour after reaching 
the sheriff's headquarters, Elstad was 
given his Miranda rights, which he subse-
quently waived. He then gave a full state-
ment confessing to the burglary. 
The trial court found Elstad guilty of 
burglary. On appeal, that decision was 
reversed on the grounds that the de-
fendant's inadmissible earlier confession 
''tainted'' the later confession which oc-
curred after the defendant was advised of 
his Miranda rights. Oregon v. Elstad, 61 
Ore. App. 673, 658 P.2d 552 (1983). In 
the words of the court, "the cat was suffi-
ciently out of the bag to exert a coercive 
impact on [the respondent's] later admis-
sion." !d. at 678, 658 P.2d at 555. The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to consider 
whether the self-incrimination clause of 
the fifth amendment requires the suppres-
sion of a confession, made after proper 
Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of 
rights solely because the police had ob-
tained an earlier voluntary admission with-
out warnings from the defendant. 
In her opinion, Justice O'Connor sug-
gests that, "a simple failure to administer 
the warnings, unaccompanied by any ac-
tual coercion or other circumstances cal-
culated to undermine the suspect's ability 
to exercise his free will" is not enough to 
taint a subsequent voluntary and informed 
waiver. Elstad, 105 S.Ct. at 1293. The 
counter argument to this coercion-based 
analysis was espoused in U.S. v. Bayer, 
331 U.S. 532 (1947). 
After the accused has once let the cat 
out of the bag by confessing, no mat-
ter what the inducement, he is never 
thereafter free of the psychological 
and practical disadvantages of having 
confessed. He can never get the cat 
back in the bag, the secret is out for 
good. In such a sense, a later confes-
sion may always be looked upon as 
fruit of the first. 
!d. at 540-41. 
Until Elstad, the state had the burden of 
showing that the lack of a warning did not 
taint subsequently obtained evidence. See 
Alderman v. United States, 594 U.S. 165 
(1969). Elstad changes this and seems to 
have placed the burden on the defendant. 
Justice Brennan explains, "the Court to-
day appears to adopt a- 'go ahead and try 
to prove it' posture toward citizens whose 
fifth amendment Miranda rights have been 
violated, an attitude that marks a sharp 
break from the Court's traditional approach 
to official lawlessness." Elstad, 105 S.Ct. 
at 1312. 
- Tom Swisher 
Archer v. Archer: PROFESSIONAL 
DEGREE IS NOT MARITAL 
PROPERTY 
In Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493 
A.2d 1074 (1985), the Maryland Court of 
Appeals joined a majority of jurisdictions 
and held that professional degrees and 
licenses earned by a spouse during the 
marriage are not marital property and, 
therefore, are not subject to a monetary 
award. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. 
§ 8-205 (1984). 
The court recognizes a broad definition 
of "property," embracing everything which 
has exchangeable value or goes to make 
up a persons worth. Nevertheless, the 
court held a professional degree to be a 
mere "expectancy of future enhanced in-
come," "an intellectual attainment," and 
not a present property interest. 
The parties to the litigation, Jeanne and 
Thomas Archer, were married in 1977 
after Thomas Archer's first year of medi-
cal school. At that time, Jeanne Archer 
was pursuing an undergraduate degree 
but left school and began to work full-
time. During their marriage, Jeanne 
Archer worked and had two children and 
Thomas Archer attended medical school. 
Thomas Archer received medical school 
expenses, a monthly stipend and other 
monies from the United States Navy. Cit-
ing recent Maryland court decisions, the 
court stated that the Family Law Article 
requires that non-monetary contributions 
should be recognized in determining the 
acquisition of marital property. Careful 
consideration should be given to both 
monetary and non-monetary contribution 
by the spouses so that property interests 
can be fairly and equitably adjusted. 
The appellant, Jeanne Archer, argued 
that marital property defined in the Fam-
ily Law Article as "the property, however 
titled, acquired by one or both of the 
parties during marriage" should be liber-
ally construed and include medical degrees 
or licenses in order to effect the broad 
remedial purposes of the Act. However, 
the Maryland Court of Appeals rejected 
this view. 
The court seemed to adopt the reason-
ing of In re Marriage of Graham, 194 
Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978), which 
held that an advanced degree or profes-
sional license lacks the traditional attri-
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butes of property. The court further noted 
in its opinion that a professional degree, 
unlike property, cannot be assigned, trans-
ferred, devised, sold, pledged or inherited. 
Other arguments supporting the rejec-
tion of the appellants proposition in-
cluded: 1) the too speculative nature of 
determining the value of a professional 
degree; 2) that an attempt to characterize 
spousal contributions as an investment or 
commercial enterprise deserving compen-
sation demeaned the concept of marriage; 
3) the degree of the spouse is personal and 
represents only the potential for future 
earnings; and 4) that a graduate degree is 
best considered when awarding alimony. 
The court rejected the opinion of a mi-
nority of jurisdictions which hold that 
"the most equitable solution" to compen-
sate one spouse for the sacrifices which 
enabled him/her to pursue a professional 
degree is to allow the supporting spouse 
to "share in the fruits" obtained by the 
other spouse. 
The court in the past has recognized 
that the broad definition of marital prop-
erty includes pension rights. Deering v. 
Deering, 292 Md. 115, 437 A.2d 883 
(1981). But, the court distinguished a 
spouse's property right to pensions from 
a professional degree. That is, a pension is 
a contractual right to a current asset which 
a spouse has a right to receive. However, 
such rights are plainly distinguishable 
from a professional degree. A professional 
degree is an intellectual attainment per-
sonal to the holder that cannot be sold, 
transferred or inherited. As the court 
stated, a degree/license does not have an 
exchange value; rather, it represents a po-
tential for "earning capacity made pos-
sible ... in combination with innumerable 
other factors too uncertain and speculative 
to constitute marital property." Archer at 
357, 493 A.2d at 1080. 
The court concluded by stating that in 
its award a chancellor should consider the 
circumstances surrounding a spouse's ac-
quisition of a professional degree/license 
as well as that spouse's potential income. 
Income earned by the acquisition of a 
professional degree/license by a spouse 
and the sacrifices of the other spouse in 
helping to attain such a degree are "fac-
tors which may" be considered by the 
court in making an alimony award. The 
court presumed that the trial court con-
sidered these "factors" in determining the 
appellant's amount of alimony ($100 per 
month not to exceed a year). However, 
the court did not consider the adequacy of 
this amount since the appellant did not 
raise that issue on appeal. 
- Gordon Daniels 
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Ake v. Oklahoma: PSYCHIATRISTS 
IN THE COURT ROOM 
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court 
confronted the issue of whether an in-
digent defendant has a constitutional right 
to the psychiatric examination and assis-
tance necessary to prepare an effective de-
fense based on his mental condition. In 
Ake v. Oklahoma, 104 S.Ct. 1087 (1985), 
the Court, speaking through Justice Mar-
shall, held that indigent defendants do, 
under certain circumstances, have a due 
process right to the assistance of a psychi-
atrist in the preparation of their defense. 
The due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment requires a state to provide an 
indigent defendant with access to "com-
petent psychiatric assistance" to aid in the 
preparation of his defense, if the defendant 
makes a preliminary showing that his san-
ity at the time of the crime will be a sig-
nificant factor at trial. Additionally, the 
Court in Ake held that an indigent defen-
dant also has the right to a psychiatrist's 
assistance at a capital sentencing proceed-
ing if the state presents psychiatric evi-
dence as to his future dangerousness. 
The defendant in Ake was charged with 
murdering a husband and wife and wound-
ing their two children. At arraignment, 
the defendant's behavior was so bizarre 
that the trial judge sua sponte ordered him 
to be examined by a psychiatrist. The 
psychiatrist found that the defendant was 
incompetent to stand trial and suggested 
that he be committed. Six weeks later, 
however, the defendant was found to be 
competent provided that he continue to 
be sedated with an antipsychotic drug. 
When the state resumed proceedings 
against the defendant, his attorney, at a 
pretrial conference, informed the court 
that he would raise an insanity defense. 
Therefore, the defense attorney requested 
a psychiatric evaluation, at state expense, 
to determine the defendant's mental state 
at the time of the crime, claiming that the 
defendant was entitled to such an evalua-
tion by the United States Constitution. The 
state court denied the defendant's request 
for such an evaluation. Consequently, 
there was no expert testimony for either 
side on the issue of the defendant's sanity 
at the time of the offense. The jury re-
jected the defendant's insanity defense 
and he was convicted of two counts of 
murder in the first degree and two counts 
of shooting with intent to kill and was 
subsequently sentenced to death. 
In determining whether, and under 
what circumstances, a state should be re-
quired to provide an indigent defendant 
with competent psychiatric assistance in 
preparing his defense, the Court employed 
a three-factor test. The three factors rele-
vant to this determination were (1) "the 
private interest that will be affected by 
the action of the State", (2) "the govern-
mental interest that will be affected if the 
safeguard is to be provided", and (3) "the 
probable value of the additional or sub-
stitute procedural safeguards that are 
sought, and the risk of an erroneous depri-
vation of the affected interest if those safe-
guards are not provided." Ake, 104 S.Ct. 
at 1094. The court in Ake, applied this 
three factor test, but considered the first 
two factors only briefly. 
Thus, in considering the first factor, 
the court found that the private interest in 
the accuracy of a criminal proceeding is 
almost uniquely compelling since a crim-
inal proceeding places an individual's life 
or liberty at risk. In considering the sec-
ond factor, the interest of the state, the 
court found that a state's interest in deny-
ing a defendant a psychiatrist's assistance 
